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Abstract
Enterprise zones are place-oriented policies that are a tool of
regional development, and refer to geographically targeted areas chosen
for development that are designated on the basis of unemployment,
poverty, population, age of housing stock, and other criteria. Firms that
locate in the area and create jobs are given tax credits, abatements and
exemptions. The underlying assumption is that firms and employees in the
zone area benefit because of a reduction in the price of capital and/or
labour, and there is expanded investment and employment generation
through deregulation.
The objective of this work is to answer what is the impact of the
enterprise zone (EZ) on the rest of the economy and labour. I develop a
theoretical model. In the model I point to the cause of unemployment in
the EZ. I show the relationship between the reservation wage and
unemployment rate, following Jones (1989). I then show the general
equilibrium response to the tax abatement provided in EZs, in a
generalised framework incorporating capital mobility, following Harberger
(1962).     The analytical framework developed indicates that the capital
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and employment impact of the tax cut on capital in the EZ depends on
three sets of parameters:
• Relative factor intensities of firms in the two areas.
• The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in firms in
the areas.
• The price elasticities of demand for goods Z and Y produced by EZ
firms and non-EZ firms respectively
The analysis also indicates that it is impossible to isolate the
incidence of the tax cut given in the EZ just to the EZ alone.
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Introduction and Motivation
Enterprise zones are place-oriented policies, they are
geographically targeted areas chosen for development. Firms that locate in
these areas are given tax credits, exemptions, and abatements for making
investments and creating jobs.
The enterprise zone concept originated in Great Britain in the late
1970s. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of Exchequer in the British
government at the time, argued that excessive regulation and bureaucracy
had led to the decline of Great Britain's economy. Howe advocated tax cuts
to promote entrepreneurship that would create jobs. Stuart Butler, a British-
trained economist, was responsible for introducing the enterprise zone
concept in the United States.
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The enterprise zone programme has been one of the most
controversial topics in the literature and in policy. The United States and a
number of countries around the world – China, the Middle East, and
countries including India have been adopting some form of such place
oriented policy – enterprise zones or special economic zones or growth
centres. A big advantage of the ‘zone’ concept being that it can be tried out
experimentally in a small area. If it works, well, it can be extended to other
parts of the country. If it does not, then we know that it doesn’t work. It thus
avoids the risks and costs of trying a programme in a full-fledged manner
without knowing its effects.
Further, place-oriented policies such as enterprise zones focus on
the area’s development rather than argue that people should be mobile.
                                                       
1In 1989, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Jack Kemp said that
he actually took the enterprise zone idea from a US program Operation Bootstrap
which spurred postwar development in Puerto Rico by cutting taxes and fostering
industry.8
Place-oriented policies such as these recognise that there are likely to be a
large number of people that are immobile because of the social,
psychological or economic costs of moving. These people are most likely to
be the ones with lower skills.
Therefore place-oriented policies such as enterprise zones
deserve in-depth consideration for their impacts on labour and the rest of
the economy. In this paper, I develop an analytical framework to analyse
the impact of the enterprise zone on the economy that adopts it, and on
labour.
II.  Literature Review
There is a vast body of policy and empirical literature that evaluates
enterprise zones. These studies have evaluated enterprise zones in the
various states of the United States -- Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Kentucky, New
Jersey and California (see Rubin & Armstrong, 1989; Erickson & Friedman,
1989; Seyfried, 1990; Elling & Sheldon, 1991; Redfield & McDonald, 1991;
Papke, 1994; Landers, 1996; Sridhar, 1996; 2000; 2001; Dowall, 1996;
Boarnet & Bogart, 1996). See Sridhar (1998) for details of these various
studies. My objective is not to summarise these studies, I provide a more
suggestive and critical review.
Few of these studies provide an analytical framework to
understand the impact of enterprise zones on their economies. Ge (1995)
and Seyfried (1990) develop an analytical model for examining the effect
of the enterprise zone for their various direct and indirect impacts on the
regional economies. Both concentrate on the production sector for
analysing the effect of enterprise zones, and focus on cost minimisation
for firms when they locate in the enterprise zone. They ignore the effects
on labour.
It is important to take into account some physical and distress
characteristics pertaining to labour in the area, because most enterprise
zone programmes, especially those in the U.S., specify explicit distress
criteria that are used for zone designation. For instance, in the state of
Illinois, enterprise zones are required to document size and distress criteria9
for Enterprise Zone designation. The size criteria in Illinois pertain to
geographical area of the zone. It specifies that an enterprise zone must be
a minimum of one-half square mile and may be up to 10 square miles,
excluding lakes and waterways. A proposed Enterprise Zone in Illinois must
satisfy at least one of four criteria concerning poverty, unemployment, low
income or population loss (see Sridhar, 1996).
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I find that none of the existing studies consider the efficiency
implications of enterprise zones or construct an analytical framework to
study their effects on labour as well.
I answer the following questions: are enterprise zones efficient if
they are adopted by high-unemployment areas? What are the impacts of
the zone on the rest of the economy? The work here addresses this gap
in the literature and develops a framework to analyse the adoption of
urban development programmes such as enterprise zones by high-
unemployment areas and examines their efficiency. It also evaluates the
impact of the zone on the rest of the economy, applying some of the
standard literature on analysing the effect of tax incentives.
III.  Objectives of Model
                                                       
2 The distress criteria specified by the Illinois Department of Commerce and
Community Affairs (DCCA) for zone designation are as follows:
a.  The poverty criterion is met if the poverty rate for each census tract that contains
any part of the Enterprise Zone is at least 20 percent, as of the 1990 federal census.
b.  The low income criterion is met if at least 70 percent of the households in the
zone have incomes equal to or less than 80 percent of the median household
income of the community in which the zone is located.
c. The unemployment criterion is met if the zone has an annual average
unemployment rate of at least 120 percent of the state's average unemployment
rate for the 12-month period ending the prior June 30.
d.  The population loss criterion is met if the Enterprise Zone suffered a population
decrease of 20 percent or more between 1980 and 1990 as determined by the 1990
federal census.10
The objectives of the model to evaluate the enterprise zone are
as follows:
• To describe the consequences of disequilibrium in the labour market
of the high-unemployment area before it is designated as EZ, and
describe the cause of unemployment in the EZ.
• To show that the area’s unemployment rate determines the
reservation wage along with a host of other factors affecting the
benefits and costs of remaining unemployed.
• To examine whether economic rent accruing from jobs to job
searchers in the EZ is higher.
• To characterise the effect of the tax abatement on capital given in
the EZ, on the EZ and the rest of the economy, taking into account
full capital mobility.
IV.  Assumptions of Model
The model that follows is based on certain assumptions.
• There are two areas in the economy: one designated as EZ and the
other being the rest of the economy, which I refer to as the non-EZ
area (or area Y). The non-EZ area may be considered as all areas
that do not have an EZ program or other programmes that abate
taxes.
 
EZ firms produce good Z, and non-EZ area firms produce good
Y. In reality this assumption is consistent with the fact that certain areas
specialise in the production of primarily certain goods. Rubin and Zorn
(1985) show the comparative cost advantage different states in the
United States have in different SIC category industries. In India, a
typology of cities and states is emerging whereby each specialises in the
output of a certain good or service. Thus, based on comparative
advantage, we could easily classify areas without loss of generality.11
Goods Y and Z are produced by two factors of production,
capital (K) and labour (L). In taking into account capital and labour, all
conventional factors of production – land, labour, capital and
organisation -- are implicitly taken into account in the model; land can be
considered a special kind of capital (real capital), and organisational
skills, a special case of labour.
LZ and LY refer respectively to labour employed in the EZ and the
non-EZ area firms. KZ and KY refer to capital employed in the EZ and
non-EZ firms respectively. PZ and PY are the prices of the final goods Z
and Y respectively. PKZ and PLZ refer to the factor prices of capital and
labour respectively in the EZ. Similarly, PKY and PLY refer to factor prices
and refer to the price paid by users of capital and the price of labour
(wage) in the non-EZ area. Because EZ areas are, in reality, blighted, it
is assumed that fLZ (the marginal product of labour in the EZ) < fLY (the
marginal product of labour in the non-EZ area). This is due to differences
in the use of capital across the areas. Specifically, KZ/LZ < KY/LY, and for
this reason, the marginal product of labour in the EZ is lower than in the
other areas.
Because fLZ < fLY, the labour market is not in equilibrium when
the EZ is designated. The model elaborates on this. The capital market is
in equilibrium so that PKZ=PKY=PK. Consumers supply the factors in fixed
amounts.
• It is assumed that production is subject to constant returns to scale
(CRTS) technology because CRTS has many interesting properties.
The assumption of CRTS means that the average as well as the
marginal products of the factors are dependent only on the ratio in
which they are combined  (Chiang, 1984; Krauss and Johnson,
1974), which, here is the capital-labour ratio.
In empirical work, studies have found that a majority of the two-
digit SIC industries they studied were subject to CRTS. An interesting old
example is Moroney (1967), in which, based upon estimates of
production functions in 2-digit SIC manufacturing industries in the United
States, he concluded that a majority of these industries were subject to
CRTS. More recent examples relate to plant-level data. Bailey et al.,
(1992) used plant level data and found that the plants they examined
were characterised by constant returns to scale. Griliches and Ringstad12
(1971) argued that essentially constant returns were needed to
rationalise the observed large dispersion of establishment sizes within a
given industry (Basu and Fernald, 1997). Basu and Fernald (1997)
concluded that a typical 2-digit industry in the United States appears to
have constant or slightly decreasing returns to scale.
Thus when we look at empirical work, it appears that CRTS may
not be an unrealistic assumption to make.
• Firms in the two areas are unequally factor intensive, or KY/LY >
KZ/LZ (Y relatively capital intense) at any given feasible factor-price
ratio. This assumption, along with CRTS, creates a production-
possibility frontier that is uniformly concave to the origin.
• The model allows for unemployment to exist.
3 This is consistent with
the way in which enterprise zones are designated on the basis of
certain distress criteria that includes (high) unemployment. LZU is the
number unemployed in the EZ. The total labour force in the EZ area
is LZ+LZU =NZ. The model allows for unemployment to exist in the
non-EZ area too (let’s say, the natural rate of unemployment), but it
is less than that in the EZ so that it does not qualify for EZ
designation. In the non-EZ area, the total labour force NY is equal to
LY + LYU. LYU is the number unemployed in the non-EZ area. The total
labour force in the economy is NZ+NY = N.
• Factors are paid according to the value of their marginal products in
equilibrium. Taken along with the assumption that fLZ < fLY, this
assumption means that wages in the EZ in the initial equilibrium are
lower than in the non-EZ area.
• The government provides a subsidy on the use of capital as well as
labour in the EZ. This is equivalent to a refund of taxes paid on
capital and labour to firms in the EZ.
• The prices of goods are defined such that the value of all goods in
the original equilibrium is 1.
                                                       
3 The section on disequilibrium in the labour market elaborates on why
unemployment comes to exist in the model. In short, unemployment exists
because of high reservation wages of labour in the EZ area when compared to
market wages.13
V. The Model
Disequilibrium in the Labour Market
The disequilibrium in the labour market of the EZ is due to its
high unemployment rate, which, by definition, means that a large
proportion of its labour force is unemployed.
Butler (1981), one of the pioneers of the EZ concept in the
United States, argued that minimum wage legislation is the primary
cause of unemployment in the United States and so relaxing this
minimum wage constraint in the areas designated as EZs would alleviate
their unemployment. However, this still does not explain why
unemployment is concentrated in certain areas that get designated as
EZs. Clearly then, the literature on EZs does not provide a model of
unemployment in the EZs, i.e., does not explain the cause of
unemployment in EZs.
This model makes an attempt to provide that explanation. Here I
elaborate on the reasons for unemployment in the EZ and
unemployment rate of the area.
a  Model of Unemployment
The model of unemployment that is developed here draws from the
neoclassical assumption of high reservation wages. This is the explanation
that individuals are unemployed if their reservation wages exceed market
wages. Such an explanation appears reasonable for individuals in the EZ
because of their high reservation wages relative to the market wage
prevailing in the EZ.
The high reservation wages in the EZ is realistic because of the
benefits of remaining unemployed in the United States (see Feldstein,
1978). The income of the unemployed is high because they are most14
probably recipients of unemployment compensation and probably other
non-market income such as welfare payments. These individuals are
unlikely to find gainful employment given their skills. This causes them to
remain unemployed. The literature on job search indicates that high
reservation wages relative to market wages cause unemployment,
especially when unemployment benefits are generous. Feldstein (1978)
shows how a combination of a high marginal tax on earnings and no tax
on unemployment compensation makes the private cost of
unemployment small and causes an individual to remain unemployed.
To understand this effect, consider a situation in which each job
searcher faces a distribution of wage offers with w
r (his reservation
wage) < E(w) (his expected wage) < w
s (the maximum wage given his
skills). This may be graphically shown in Figure 1. In figure 1, the
horizontal axis is the wage rate w(s) (wage given skills). The vertical axis
is a frequency (refers to the number) of job offers available at the various
wage rates.  In the middle of the curve is shown the highest frequency
and it decreases as we move away from the mean/median/mode. The
curve that is thus obtained in the figure is the probability density function
of the random variable called wage.  It is normally distributed with mean
at E(w). Given that the person finds a job, his/her expected wage is the
weighted average of the job offers in the w(r) to w(s) range. This average
wage is denoted by E(w) in figure 1, which shows that the mean is also
the median and the mode.
We know that the individual would reject any job offer that offers
w < w
r. Thus the area under the curve between w
r and w
s represents the
probability of the job searcher finding an acceptable job in any period
(see Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). The higher this probability, the lower
the expected duration of unemployment. The benefits (such as
unemployment compensation) of remaining unemployed essentially
decrease the area under this curve by increasing w
r (moves it further to
the right) and lengthens the duration of unemployment.
The unemployed in high-unemployment areas place a high value
on the importance of having a job when compared to those in low-
unemployment areas, as Bartik (1991) argues (see also Theodossiou,
1992). They are willing to take up a job that offers income higher than
their current income. But they are less mobile due to psychological ties to
the area and costs of relocation. Therefore such individuals (who have15
high reservation wages relative to low market wages) tend to be
concentrated in the EZ area.
The market wage is low because profit-maximising employers
are willing to pay a wage only according to the skill of the workers. We
know that by assumption 2 of the model that fLZ < fLY, i.e., the marginal
product of labour in the EZ is less than in the non-EZ area. The literature
on enterprise zones points to the blight in these areas, which, according
to this model, is due to the low capital-labour ratio in the EZ. The low
capital-labour ratio leads to low productivity in the EZ for those employed
and potential low productivity for those who are unemployed. So the EZ
labour force is eligible only for a lower market wage.
Wage Rate
wr E(w) ws 0
Frequency of Job
Offers
                              Figure 1: The Distribution of Wage Offers
This model offers an explanation as to why individuals with high
reservation wages relative to low potential market wages tend to be
concentrated in the EZ area. So prior to the designation of the area as an
EZ, profit-maximising employers do not have incentives to hire workers
with low skills. It is likely too that these individuals are recipients of
unemployment compensation, and are unlikely to find gainful16
employment given their skills, although they do place a high value on the
importance of having a job.
So formally, the unemployment status (USij) of an individual i
living in the jth area is determined by the difference between reservation
and market wage.





ij is the reservation wage and wij is the market wage of the ith individual
living in the jth area. The unemployment rate of the jth area may be
summed over the unemployment status of i individuals living in the jth
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Thus the aggregate unemployment rate in the jth area is
dependent on the extent to which reservation wages of individuals are
higher than market wages in the aggregate. Specifically, [1a] and [2a]
show that the unemployment rate of the EZ is high if the reservation
wages of individuals are high relative to market wage in the area. Thus
the high unemployment rate in the EZ is due to the low productivity of
labour and their relatively higher reservation wages compared to the
market wage.
Thus under conditions of high unemployment rate, EZ
designation of the area acts as an important place-oriented policy to
improve the blighted area in which tax abatements are provided to arrest
the decline of the area. Tax abatements provide firms with incentives for
investment. In the section on general equilibrium I show how the tax
abatement in the EZ induces in-migration of capital into the EZ due to the
shifting of resources to the EZ area from the other area. I elaborate on
the general equilibrium effects of tax abatement provided to firms in the
EZ, first explaining the relationship between the reservation wage and17
the local unemployment rate and the effect of new employment on
economic rents in the EZ.
Next, I explain the relationship between the reservation wage
and unemployment rate.
The Reservation Wage
It is useful to recognise in a model that allows for unemployment
that the standard environment in which job search is modeled involves
the search for a job from a known distribution of job offers. Various
models of job search (Jones, 1989; Addison & Siebert, 1979; Ehrenberg
and Smith, 1993) show that the unemployed individual’s decision to work
is determined by the various costs and benefits of unemployment.
The model here follows Jones (1989) closely. As in Jones
(1989), let Q be the instantaneous probability of receiving a job offer and
F(w) be the distribution of job offers. From the viewpoint of the individual
job searcher, the decision to work is a function of the benefits and costs
(b-c) of remaining unemployed. b is the benefit level while remaining
unemployed, and c is a measure of the costs of being unemployed. I
assume that job searchers try to maximise their utility by maximising the
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In [1c], r is the interest rate, V is the present discounted value of
being unemployed, (b-c) refers to the net benefits of being unemployed.
The latter part of the equation represents the capital gains derived from
the income from a job, which is the maximum of the net income from a
job (which is net of the value of being unemployed, V) if employment is
found or zero. In such a situation, the optimal job search strategy
displays the reservation wage property with the critical value being the
reservation wage w
r (also see Zuckerman, 1984). The reservation wage,
or the lowest wage at which the unemployed are willing to supply positive




[2c] shows that the reservation wage w
r equals imputed search
income.
4 Substituting for rV from [2c] in [1c],
￿
¥
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Thus the reservation wage, as in [3c], equals the net benefits (b-
c) while unemployed, and a factor that depends on the expected wage in
next employment adjusted for the arrival rate of job offers. Then it is
possible to approximate [3c] in some linear fashion as in Jones (1989):
wi
r = a0 + a1(bi -ci) + a2mi + a3Qi + ei---------------------------------------------[4c]
In [4c], bi –ci is the difference between benefits and costs of
remaining unemployed for the ith individual, mi is the expected wage in
next employment, Qi is the arrival rate of job offers as defined earlier,
and ei is a random error term. Qi is a function of the various individual-
specific characteristics as well as regional labour market conditions that
determine the arrival rate of job offers. So
￿ = Q
j ij j i X 3 a
The unemployment rate of the area is an important indicator of
the regional labour market conditions that determines the arrival rate of
job offers for individual i and so of his/her reservation wage. So
substituting for Qi in [4c],
                                                       
4 Alternatively, rather than measuring the reservation wage as a single point that
I actually measure in the empirical work, the reservation wage can be identified
as a locus of points at various hours of work, consistent with neoclassical labour
theory. This is because the reservation wage could be declining with the
hypothetical hours of work that is offered at the “new job”. One could expect that
the reservation wage increases with additional hours of work, to compensate for
leisure lost. In the literature, there are few instances in which the hours of work
as well as the reservation wage are taken into account in job search. Blau (1991)
develops a model which predicts that a low-earnings job might be accepted if the
hours were low also, and a high-earnings job might be rejected if the hours were
also high. Empirically also, he finds that workers are clearly not indifferent
between alternative combinations of weekly hours and earnings.19
wi
r = a0 + a1(bi -ci) + a2mi + a3Uij + ei--------------------------------------------[5c]
Uij is the unemployment rate of the jth area (j=Z,Y) in which the
ith individual lives.
[5c] is estimable. Jones (1989), Sridhar (1996) and Haurin and
Sridhar (2003) estimate this relationship.
Moreover, a hypothesis can also be formulated with regard to the
relationship between the reservation wage and the area’s unemployment
rate. The actual experience of job searchers in high-unemployment
areas shows that they are willing to accept lower reservation wages for
some reasons: it is more likely than not that they are risk-averse.
Although it is reasonable to expect that unemployed job searchers even
in high-unemployment areas frequently begin their search with a high
reservation wage, as time passes on, they are likely to lower their
reservation wage for reasons of family or financial hardship (see
Theodossiou, 1992). Thus the reservation wage of unemployed
searchers can be considered a gradually declining function of time spent
in unemployment, which can be considered long in high-unemployment
areas because they are risk-averse, or have family/psychological ties to
the area or are not willing to bear the costs of relocation. The testable
hypothesis that comes out of this is that unemployment rate of the area
has a negative impact on the reservation wage of individuals residing in
the area.
Economic Rent
As in standard labour economic theory, we can define economic
rent bij as the extent to which actual wages are above the reservation
wage. That is,





ij are respectively the wage and reservation wage of the
ith individual in the jth area.
5
                                                       
5 The important point here is that if hours are flexible and chosen by the
individual, they will continue to increase work hours until, at the margin, the
reservation wage = market wage. In this case, the economic rent is zero. An
alternative assumption is that hours of work are not flexible. Under this20
If the hypothesised relationship between the reservation wage
and the area’s unemployment rate were true, the reservation wage (w
r
ij)
would be low in the EZ because of its high unemployment rate. Notice
that the cause of unemployment for individuals in the high-
unemployment area is high reservation wages, but this is relative to the
market wage. This is not inconsistent with the relatively low reservation
wages in the high-unemployment area when compared to the low-
unemployment area (this refers to the relationship between the
reservation wage and unemployment rate of the area).
However, wages (wz) in the EZ are also low (compared to the
non-EZ area) due to low capital-labour ratio in the EZ (see assumption 6
of model). If a similar hypothesis were to hold in the non-EZ area, it
would have higher reservation wage (w
r
y) than the EZ. However wages in
the non-EZ area (wy) are high by assumption 6. So it is difficult to
conclude whether the EZ or non-EZ area will benefit from higher
economic rents. Thus, it is an open question that can be tested in the
empirical work as to whether economic rents would be higher in high or
low unemployment areas. Remembering, however, that the relationship
between the reservation wage and the unemployment rate is
hypothesised to be negative, meaning that reservation wages can be
expected to be lower in high-unemployment areas.
In the section on general equilibrium I show how the tax
abatement in the EZ induces in-migration of capital into the EZ due to the
shifting of resources to the EZ area from outside. I elaborate on the
general equilibrium effects of tax abatement provided to firms in the EZ,
and the effect of new employment on economic rents in the EZ.
The General Equilibrium Response to the Tax Abatement
                                                                                                                           
assumption, there is an economic rent. Given that the number of hours are fixed
per week at 40 and the individual’s reservation wage is less than the wage, there
is economic rent. Here I rely on the fixed hours hypothesis as a possibility, and
so economic rents do accrue to individuals. This corresponds to the assumption
of the reservation wage for a full-time job (40 hours a week) in the empirical
work, where the reservation wage is measured as the lowest wage one is willing
to take home as pay for a full-time job (as in the PSID).21
Harberger (1962) considers the effect (and the ultimate
incidence) of a sector-specific corporation income tax, taking into
account its general equilibrium effects on the entire economy. His
analysis has become a standard framework for analysing different kinds
of taxes in the literature. I adopt his analytical framework here to analyse
the effect of the property tax abatement provided to firms in EZs that is
equivalent to a tax cut on the use of capital in the EZ.
In addition to a subsidy to capital, most state enterprise zone
programs (including Ohio) also include a subsidy for labour. So I also
include in the model a subsidy to labour. An equal subsidy for labour and
capital is the same as a subsidy for the good produced by the sector.
Therefore I decompose the subsidy to capital and labour into a subsidy
for one input (i.e., the tax abatement which is a subsidy to capital), and a
subsidy for the output (produced by the EZ sector). The subsidy for the
output results in a reduction in the price of the good produced by the EZ
sector, which becomes (PZ - CZ), where CZ is the subsidy on the output.
The tax abatement, according to Harberger’s analysis, is
equivalent to a tax cut which will have the immediate effect of creating a
wedge between the price of capital between the EZ and the rest of the
economy. Users of capital in the EZ pay a lesser price (PK - AKZ) for the
use of capital, where AKZ is the tax abated on capital invested in the EZ.
The tax abatement has the effect of lowering the price of good Z that EZ
firms produce because investors in the EZ can now produce and supply
higher output at the same cost as before, due to the savings induced by
the abatement. Investors in the non-EZ area firms still continue to pay
the price on capital, PK, which includes the tax (there are no taxes abated
in the non-EZ). It is likely at this point that firms in the non-EZ area will
increase their supply of good Y by an amount that is sufficient to lower
the price of Y on par with that of Z. Whether or not the non-EZ area firms
are able to do this depends on the demand elasticity for the good (Z)
produced by the EZ firms. The percentage change in the demand for Z
as a result of the tax abatement, is formally derived below.
The Goods Market: Demand
In a two-good economy, one would expect the demand for goods
to have some price elasticity and that Z and Y would be substitutes. To













[1d] shows that the demand for Z is a function of the price of Z and Y.
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By assumption [8], the price of goods (PZ - CZ) and PY, are equal
to 1, and [3d] can be written as:
dZ
Z
































 is the demand elasticity





.  So in simplified form, [4d]
may be written finally as:
) ( Y z z dP dC dP
Z
dZ
- - = e -----------------------------------------------------[5d]23















Equation [5d] shows that the percentage change in the demand
for Z depends on elasticity of demand for Z in terms of relative prices. It
should be noted that the elasticity appearing in [5d] is compensated
because the marginal propensity to consume of households and the
government are assumed to be equal so that the income effect in
consumer demand exactly offsets that in government demand (see
Myles, 1995). Thus only the substitution effect is present.
If |e| >0, the demand for Z (produced by the EZ firms) increases
in response to a decrease in its price.
The Goods Market: Supply
For market clearance the percentage change in demand for Z
must equal the percentage change in supply of Z. To determine the
percentage change in the supply of Z, we totally differentiate the

















Expressing [6d] in percentage change form, and dividing the LHS and
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Supply
= -----------------------------------------------[9d]
In [9d], it may be noted that qKZ is the share of capital income in
the value-added, qLZ is the share of labour income, in the value added
for firms in the EZ.
[9d] shows that the percentage change in the supply of output by
EZ firms depends on the shares of labour and capital income in the
value-added for EZ firms.
The Factor Market: Firms’ demand for factors
Because of a shift in demand for good Z, increased profits
accrue to EZ firms that produce Z. So the non-EZ area capital will have
an incentive to flow into the EZ, in order to equalise returns to factors in
both the areas. What happens then depends on relative factor
intensities, and the firms’ demand for factors in the two areas.
Following Harberger, changes in factor demands can be
specified in terms of their direct elasticities of substitution. So I define

























































SZ and SY are respectively the direct elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour, of firms in the EZ and non-EZ areas. With
the marginal products in the EZ and non-EZ area firms equal to their
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When we do this similarly for Y, we get:






















Equations [18d] and [19d] show that the percentage change in
the demand for capital over labour depends on the elasticity of
substitution between the factors as well as change in their prices. Thus
the relative growth of demand for capital and labour will differ. While
factor markets continue to equate factor prices with values of marginal
products, equilibrium is attained only when factor prices (wages and
returns to capital) are equalised across the areas.
It may be noted here that reservation wages (w
r
z) are lower in
the EZ area because of its high unemployment rate (recall the
hypothesised relationship between the area’s unemployment rate and w
r
z
(the reservation wage)). As capital continues to flow into the EZ, demand
for labour increases, as described above. This increases employment
(LZ) in the EZ. However, it has to be noted that first-order effects always
dominate. This means that firms that locate eventually in the EZ are27
more capital-intensive, although they also have increased demand for
labour.
6
With increasing employment in the EZ, there is a high probability
that local residents get the jobs created by the new capital. This is
because new jobs in the EZ are assumed to be allocated to unemployed
on a random selection process. When the selection process for jobs is
random, zone residents (even though they have few skills) have equal
chance of being selected from the pool of unemployed, by employers
who are now subsidised.
The assumption of a random selection process in the EZ when
firms create jobs is supported by empirical evidence. Empirical work
reports that on average, about 50 percent of jobs created in the EZ go to
zone residents. In a collection of ten case studies of state-designated
enterprise zones, the U.S.Department of HUD (1986) observed that 70
percent of jobs in the Bridgeport EZ in CT, 70 percent of jobs created in
the Chicago EZ in IL, 46 percent of those created in the Macon EZ in
MO, 19 percent in Michigan City, IN, 30 percent in the Tampa zone (FL)
and 5 percent of the York zone (in PA) were held by zone residents. In
the Louisville (Kentucky) zone, it was found that 31 percent of the jobs
created were held by persons who were either lower income or zone
residents. Erickson and Friedman (1989), based on a survey of local
enterprise zone coordinators conducted by the U.S. Department of HUD,
found that the mean share of jobs held by zone residents was over 61
percent with a median of over 68 percent. More recently, Immergluck’s
(1997) data from the Chicago EZ indicated that the barriers between EZ
residents and jobs are dependent on some factors. He found that local
employment was much higher in Latino parts of the zone and in African
American neighborhoods where there were more public sector jobs, very
small firms, and few manufacturers.
Thus, when a substantial portion of the jobs that are created go
to zone residents the unemployment rate of the EZ decreases. With
increasing use of capital and increase in the capital-labour ratio, labour
productivity and industrial output rise. Some explanations for rising
industrial output (apart from the increasing use of capital) could be due to
                                                       
6 We should note that we are comparing firms with high capital-labour ratios to
ones with low ratios.28
improved managerial and organisational capabilities and enhanced
labour efficiency through on-the-job training programs in the EZ area.
Thus at the optimum, the unemployment rate in the EZ is lower
than in the initial equilibrium, and that in the non-EZ areas is the same as
before. This is because of increasing demand for labour due to rise in the
capital-labour ratio and rising productivity of labour in the EZ. We have to
note that the non-EZ areas were operating at a natural rate of
unemployment initially. Tobin (1972) estimated that a 5-6 percent natural
rate of unemployment has been associated with more than 20 percent
excess capacity in the capital stock. Thus the EZ acts only as a tool to
direct the excess capacity of capital in the full-employment areas to high
unemployment areas and serves to reduce their unemployment rate. It
should be noted that the model says that capital moves across areas;
this does not necessarily imply migration of firms. But the movement of
capital causes an improvement in the total economy’s overall well-being,
although a change in the price of capital initiated in one area due to the
existence of the EZ, is transmitted to other areas.
Market Clearance
For market clearance, the goods and factor markets have to







Because capital and labour are in fixed supply, the amounts of
their in-migration into the EZ must be equal to the amount of their out-
migration from the non-EZ region so that:
dKZ = -dKY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------[21d]
dLZ = -dLY-----------------------------------------------------------------------------[22d]
The above conditions show that what capital and labour the EZ
gains must be equal to the amounts of the factors lost by the non-EZ
area.29
Comparative Statics: Change in Capital and Labour in the EZ
In order to obtain the change in the capital invested (dKz)  and
labour (dLz) in the EZ at the equilibrium as in Harberger’s model, I follow
the procedure described in Myles (1995) most closely. After some
manipulation, we end up with a system of three simultaneous equations
that can be solved simultaneously for dKz, dLz, and dPK. The
simultaneous system that was used to solve for dKz, dLz, and dPK is































































































The simultaneous system, when solved, gives the solution for
dKz, dLz, and dPK. The exact expressions obtained for dKz and dLz
(which are of greater interest because one of the important goals of EZs
is to promote employment and investment growth in the designated
areas) are quite cumbersome and so I do not report them here. It is
reported in the Appendix. It is sufficient to note that the change in capital
invested and labour, dKz and dLz, depend on the relative magnitude of
certain parameters in equilibrium. At any rate the framework provided
above indicates that the effect of the tax abatement on dKz, and dLz is
testable.
More generally, the Harberger analysis, when applied to property
tax abatements in EZs, indicates that the capital and employment impact
of the tax cut on capital in the EZ depends on three sets of parameters:
• Relative factor intensities of firms in the two areas.
• The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in firms in
the areas.30
• The price elasticities of demand for goods Z and Y produced by EZ
firms and non-EZ firms respectively.
The analysis also indicates that it is impossible to isolate the
incidence of the tax cut given in the EZ just to the EZ alone. Because
competitive factor markets equalise returns to capital everywhere in the
economy, if investors in the EZ enjoyed an increase in the return to
capital, investors everywhere will experience the same increase as well.
Moreover because goods and factor markets are interdependent, the
changes could get transmitted to consumers in the form of changes in
goods prices.
Thus Harberger’s analysis describes how the migration of capital
occurs in response to changes in the rate of return to capital across
areas. The general equilibrium response to the tax abatement is shown
in figure 2. Figure 2 shows that the tax abatement (tax cut) on capital
leads to in-migration of capital into the EZ. Depending on the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour (SZ), the new capital leads to
increase in productivity, wages and employment. This affects the
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate finally determines the
reservation wage. The difference between wages and reservation wages
determines economic rent.
More specifically, the testable hypotheses that emerge from the
theoretical model are:
• The relationship between the reservation wage and unemployment rate
• The determinants of area unemployment rate being the EZ (or the
existence of other tax incentive programs), the duration of the EZ
program’s existence and labour in-migration into the area. It may be
noted that the context for this test is laid out in figure 2.  A reduction
in the price of capital through tax abatements (that occurs only in EZ-
designated or tax incentive areas) increases the capital-labour ratio
in the EZ and increases labour productivity, raising wages and
employment and affects the unemployment rate. Increasing wages
encourage labour in-migration into the zone, which affects the
unemployment rate by changing the allocation of employment
created by zone firms. Thus, zone designation, the duration of the
zone’s existence, and population in-migration into the area affect its
unemployment rate according to the model.31
Thus, one of the testable hypotheses that emerges from the
model is that in an empirical examination of the unemployment rate, we
include a dummy for tax incentive programs, the duration of the zone’s
existence, in addition to other controls as exogenous variables. The
other control variables are skill differences (some skills have lower
unemployment rates than others), and demographic characteristics
(unemployment rates vary across various demographic groups) such as
race, age, sex composition, and educational attainment of the area.32
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In the empirical work, one could empirically test these hypotheses that
emerge from the theoretical model. The question as to whether or not dAjz
> dbjz, i.e., whether the cost of the abatement (EZ program) exceeds the
economic rent that accrues to the individuals employed in the EZ at
equilibrium forms the basis for the benefit-cost analysis in the empirical
work reported in Sridhar (2001).
VI.  Predictive Power of Model
It is a widely accepted view that a model should be judged by the
accuracy with which it can predict what we observe as well as the
realism of its assumptions. The predictive power of the model that is
presented here depends on the realism of the assumptions.
First, the assumption of disequilibrium in the EZ before EZ
designation is consistent with what we observe. EZs are in reality
abandoned areas with high unemployment rate (when we take into
account the designation criteria in most of the state enterprise zone
programs). Hence for persons in the EZ, the job search behavior
characterised by low reservation wages seems realistic due to reasons
of family or other psychological reasons or costs of relocation.
Further, the general equilibrium response to the tax abatement is
to be expected because of the inherent mobility of capital in response to
changes in its price until it is equalised across areas. Further, the effects
could get transmitted to the goods market in both the areas as well. Thus
the analysis indicates that it is impossible to isolate the incidence of the
tax abatement to the EZ alone, which mirrors reality. A simple example
of this in the model is the movement of capital. The model indicates that
the migration of capital (not necessarily of firms) serves to lower the
unemployment rate of the EZs, without changing that in the other areas.
Thus, when we begin with realistic assumptions regarding initial
conditions in the EZ and study the implications of a tax abatement in the
context of a theoretical framework, we obtain a set of hypotheses that
seem plausible and testable. Given these facts, the model that is34
presented here is of sufficient generality that it is applicable to most
enterprise zone programmes.35
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APPENDIX
Solutions For Change In Employment And Investment In
Enterprise Zone.
Solution to the System of Equations
The simultaneous equations are in matrix form, and Cramer’s






where |D| is the determinant of the matrix and |D1| is the determinant of
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where |D| is the determinant of the matrix as before and |D2| is
the determinant of the matrix with its second column now replaced by the
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